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This paper provides a view of soft budget constraint to research how the venture 
capitalists choose the way to involve in the startups which are in the listed companies 
of SMEs and GEM later. The venture capitalists show the characteristics of soft 
budget constraint in the different situations of involvement, they always select the 
right way to maximize their benefits, such as the way of standalone investment,  
correlated venture capital investment, and mixing the role of shareholder and 
underwriter. 
The venture capitalists play a role of certification on the quality of the issuers by 
screening projects, providing value-added services. So it can mitigate the information 
asymmetry between the investors of the market and the insiders. The venture 
capitalists spend most of their energies and time in screening projects, providing 
value-added services, and interacting with startups. All of these are convergent to a 
point that the venture capitalists should be sure that the projects are good, which are 
worth to be invested; otherwise the venture capitalists would lose the money.  
However, in the case of the bad project, will the venture capitalists give up, or 
reinvest? If the profit by reinvesting is larger than the loss of the project abandoned, 
the venture capitalists would make a decision to reinvest. Then soft budget constraint 
arise, the ex post   efficiency would substitute the ex ante efficiency.  
As for the innovations and the main points of this paper, firstly, by combining 
the theoretical analysis with the empirical study methods, the paper explores the 
characteristics of soft budget constraint which arise in the venture capital backed 
companies of SMEs and GEM. Secondly, through theoretical analysis, the paper 
generalizes the problem of venture capitalists’ private benefits. The venture capitalists 
that have their own private benefits would be induced to take action of soft budget 
constraint more easily than those who haven’t. To be consistent with the 














from another. Thirdly, staged investment is always regarded as a mechanism to 
control the cost of the agency problem; from another point of view, it also can be used 
to soften the constraint on the startup by the venture capitalists. Fourthly, venture 
capital standalone investment can be viewed as a tool which the venture capitalists 
choose to increase the investment project’s probability of success. Fifthly, venture 
capital involves the startup by standalone or syndicated investments, which reveal the 
information differentially. When we explore the role of the venture capitalists in 
revealing the information, it does not work to just distinguish between venture capital 
and other capital. Sixthly, when the underwriter and its affiliated venture capital 
appear in the startup together, the underwriter have to keep an eye on the trade-off 
between his profit maximization and the costs of institution; under the background of 
the current securities regulatory system in china, facing to a bad project, the 
underwriter would soften the constraint on the issuing firm in order to maximize the 
profit because of the low costs of violation. 
This paper shows that during the course of involvement in the startup, the 
venture capitalists apparently have the incentive to complete the projects by softening 
the budget constraint. IPOs in which venture capitals choose the standalone 
investment have higher underpricing than non-standalone investment IPOs; similarly, 
IPOs in which the standalone investment of state-owned venture capitals exhibit 
higher underpricing than non-state-owned venture capitals IPOs, or than 
non-standalone investment of state-owned venture capitals IPOs; IPOs in which the 
venture capitalist are affiliated to the underwriter that invested the startup in the early 
stage show higher underpricing than non-affiliated venture capitals backed IPOs and 
non-venture capitals backed IPOs. 
From the soft budget constraint standpoint, we can provide a new way to explain 
that why the venture capitalists select the standalone investment mode to push 
forward the projects; it also can explain that why the venture capitalists propel to 
finish the projects by the modes of correlated venture capitals. 
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第一章   导论 
~ 1 ~ 
 
第一章  导论 










第一节  研究背景与问题提出 
一、研究背景 
我国第一家风险资本投资公司（中国风险投资有限公司）于 1985 年设立，












                                                                 
① 风险资本（VC）与私募股权投资（PE）之间的区别尚未有清晰而又一致的结论，在研究上一般也未做区
分，本文沿用这一通常的做法，将 VC 和 PE 统称为风险资本（VC）。 



















表 1－1：中小板、创业板 2004－2011 年各年上市公司 
及 VC 背景的上市公司③分布情况 
项
目 




上市企业数 38 12 52 100 71 54 204 115 646 
其中有 VC 背景的企业数 6 3 11 30 25 24 89 55 243 




上市企业数 - - - - - 36 117 128 281 
其中有 VC 背景的企业数 - - - - - 27 65 73 165 
有 VC 背景所占比例 - - - - - 75% 56% 57% 59% 
合
计 
上市企业数 38 12 52 100 71 90 321 243 927 
其中有 VC 背景的企业数 6 3 11 30 25 51 154 128 408 
有 VC 背景所占比例 16% 25% 21% 30% 35% 57% 48% 53% 44% 
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